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approval was apparently only temporary, for in 1794 a Spanish edition in four volumes was issued.

In view of this remarkable diffusion of the work, it is, perhaps, rather surprising that *The Wealth of Nations* was not referred to in the House of Commons until seven years after its publication, when it was on the eve of a third edition. It was quoted as an authority next in 1787 and 1788, but not again until Pitt's admiring reference to it in his budget speech, February 17, 1792. The first reference to it in the House of Lords was in 1793.

But the influence of *The Wealth of Nations* on English policy was more marked than would appear from the parliamentary debates. In 1777 Lord North imposed two new taxes which had been suggested in its pages, one on man-servants, and one on property sold at auction. The inhabited house duty and the malt tax of the budget of 1778 were also derived from the same source. The extensive, but unacknowledged, use made of *The Wealth of Nations* by Hamilton, in his Report on Manufactures in 1791, has, apparently, escaped Mr. Rae's notice. The reactionary feeling arising from the French Revolution, as it retarded all movements of political reform, likewise checked the influence of *The Wealth of Nations*, although without seriously impairing its sale.

EDWARD GAYLORD BOURNE.

The Decline and Fall of Napoleon. By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P. (Boston : Roberts Brothers. 1895. Pp. viii, 203.) *The Rise of Wellington.* By General LORD ROBERTS, V.C. (Boston : Roberts Bros. 1895. Pp. x, 198.)

THESE admirable monographs, by the new Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, and by the special pet and hero of to-day's British soldier, giving in a crisp *resumé* the last half of the career of Napoleon, and the entire career of Wellington, form an initial part of the Pall Mall Magazine Library, and contain information, not indeed new, but so concentrated that the reader, whom sparse time forbids Jomini or Napier, may refresh his knowledge of the era which the restless Corsican made immortal. Limited by space, there is yet a well-digested mass within these covers, clearly collated and tersely expressed. To the British public they must be highly acceptable ; their chief interest to us lies in their thoroughly British point of view. To the average Briton, the Titanic wars from 1796 to 1815 seem to have been mainly waged by England ; Napoleon's downfall to have been due to her men and money ; the gigantic continental armies and equal expenditure to have counted for less. "It must be generally admitted," says Lord Wolseley, "that it was the war maintained by England against France, in Spain by land, and all over the world by sea, together with . . . her lavish subsidies, that eventually destroyed him." This view is traceable to that Anglo-Saxon singleness of aim which has conquered the world, the inheritance of which indeed has built up our own great country. Were one of us to write from

the "Greater Britain" standpoint, he might reach the same wrong estimate. From a national standpoint the sense of international proportion is lost, and too much stress is laid upon the work done by one's own people. Should these volumes fall into the hands of a man unfamiliar with those stupendous twenty years, he must conclude that England, with her three-score thousand British soldiers in the Peninsula, was the main instrument in forcing Napoleon's first abdication; and that Wellington, with his 25,000 British soldiers at Waterloo, was the absolute cause of his ruin. The millions of men raised by the continental nations, their death-roll greater many fold than all the men England put into the field, seem to vanish from the stage; and "Marschall Vorwärts," without whom Waterloo would have a French triumph, is quite forgotten. In the same manner, Eugene is never mentioned in connection with Marlborough: Blenheim becomes a British victory. This is inseparable from any strictly biographical sketch; only scrutiny of the subject from a point of view not national will gauge the relative values. The facts are that England's supremacy at sea was a considerable factor in the problem; that her subsidies were important; that her military aid on land was trivial. Were it possible for an unprejudiced statistician to reduce to percentages her value in the entire struggle, it would surprise one to see for how much less she counted than these volumes indicate.

Not but that the eminent writers aim to be fair. Lord Wolseley characterizes Napoleon as a Colossus among men, the greatest of all captains; he does abundant credit to his supreme military genius. Napoleon's decline, traced to a mysterious malady, Lord Wolseley begins in 1812; but it is clear that in 1809 there was distinct failure of his early decisiveness; mental and nervous strain were reacting on his physique. The sketch is able and forcible, and the volume, except for the modernized punctuation, which distinctively hampers instead of helps, is very pleasant reading.

In his busy life, as his articles show, Lord Wolseley has studied our civil war quite superficially. The continental critics have gone into them more *au fond*, and have discovered their good as well as their weak points. Lord Wolseley insists much on the value of regulars, forgetful that (as Lord Roberts points out) the best of all schools is the school of practice, and speaks of our 1865 troops as "undisciplined and untrained." The fact is, that in 1865 (eliminating all foreign-born) there were on both sides a million Anglo-Saxons, the residuum of over three million enlistments, who were the veterans of four years of war and 200 pitched battles, a body in which over a hundred regiments lost in killed in some one action a percentage higher than that of the heroic Balaclava charge, — many almost twice as much; a body in which from 1861 to 1865 the killed and wounded in battle averaged over 400 men a day; a body hardened by marching and fighting unsurpassed in any age; a body as good as and far more numerous than any army England ever boasted. Though they might not have saluted as stiffly, or pipe-clayed their belts as white as Tommy Atkins, they had learned their duty in a struggle against equal opponents. England stands

alone in not having, for many generations, had a war which jeopardized her very life ; her campaigns for eighty years have been much like our Indian struggles ; since the Crimea she has not faced a civilized opponent ; war according to the larger standard is unknown to the British soldier. To Lord Wolseley the Tel-el-Kebir campaign naturally appears to exhibit greater skill and fortitude than the Wilderness, where in thirty days some 70,000 English-speaking men bit the dust ; but the soldiers who have most studied and seen serious war, will not agree with him in depreciating the American volunteer. As a raw recruit he did, in truth, stampede at Bull Run, for which act it would not be hard to find precedents, even among British regulars ; but he later learned to stand decimation unequalled since the battles of Napoleon. Dating from 1862 he was as good a soldier (whether regular or not) as has stood in arms since the disbandment of the Old Guard. Lord Wolseley never commanded — has never known — his equal.

Lord Roberts places Napoleon less high than Lord Wolseley does — possibly second to Wellington. He underrates him, charging him, for instance, with many mistakes in the Waterloo campaign, while Wellington made none, — an opinion quite untenable. Such estimates, however, to those who know this era, lend the book additional color.

Great Britain has always rewarded her heroes with royal munificence, and her sons serve her the better for their blind belief. In addition to many earlier gifts, Wellington was voted in 1814 £400,000, the equivalent to-day of five millions of dollars. What would Grant or Sherman, over whose paltry \$15,000 a year for life Congress fought so stingily, have said to this? England's coffers have been always full, and if money is the sinews of war, then she truly bore her share in the Napoleonic struggle, for her subventions to her men-rich, coin-poor continental allies, in 1815, rose to £11,000,000 a month.

In Lord Roberts' sketch of Wellington's character, he conceals no weakness nor (except in the comparative values) exaggerates his strength. The Peninsular campaign is lucidly summarized, the story of Waterloo happily told. Wellington had many of the qualities of the great captain, — a marked fondness for the offensive, judgment rarely at fault, tenacity of purpose, industry, push, patience and self-control under reverses, exceptional discrimination, and the ability to control though not to win the love of his men. Curiously, his despatches give small credit to the quality of his armies ; and yet they marched and fought, as the Briton always does, superbly. The one quality Wellington lacked was that imagination without which no general reaches the highest rank. That he, with Blücher's aid, won at Waterloo, no more places him beside Napoleon than Zama raises Scipio to the level of Hannibal. Wellington may be fairly classed with Turenne, Eugene, and Marlborough. He can be ranked higher only from a British point of view.

The matter of these volumes never loses its interest. The manner of its presentation is what one might expect from the brilliant initial volumes

of the biographer of Marlborough, and from so able and straightforward a soldier as the man who marched from Kabul to Kandahar. They are a welcome addition to any library.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

Histoire de mon Temps; Mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier, publiés par M. le duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier. Deuxième partie; Restauration, III. 1824-1830. Tome sixième. (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1895. Pp. 485.)

THE sixth and last volume of Pasquier's *Mémoires* is, strictly speaking, a history of the decline and fall of the restored elder branch of the Bourbon dynasty. Those familiar with the earlier volumes will not anticipate, in the closing one, any of the personal interest which attaches to the traditional French memoirs. There is neither wit nor wickedness. It reads like a lawyer's brief, and even the sedate reminiscences of Miot de Melito have not a little *verve* when contrasted with its systematic and unswerving progress. The chancellor confines himself closely to a narrative of the policy of Charles' ministers and their relations with the legislative chamber. There are no wandering personal recollections. When the author introduces himself, it is as a government official. The reader is, however, more than compensated for the palpable want of animation by the writer's admirable impartiality and coolness of judgment. There is nothing vindictive, for example, in his treatment of Charles X., in spite of the king's dislike for him. On the contrary, M. Pasquier, who had at least one opportunity of judging of the king's conduct in council, frankly owns that he was surprised at his intelligent participation in the discussion. Charles appears, moreover, to have listened to M. Pasquier's denunciation of the interference of the administration in elections, not only with equanimity, but even with approval. The writer's only object is to explain the king's policy and motives, and the attitude of the deputies and journalists toward the changing administration. There is a complete absence of the customary pen-pictures. The characters of the public men are exhibited only in their actions.

M. Pasquier had exceptional advantages for observing and ascertaining the true course of events. He had three times occupied a ministerial position under Louis XVIII., and was more than once included in the proposed ministerial combinations under Charles X. Although he wisely refused these invitations, he was naturally deeply interested in the inner history of the successive cabinets and gives it an important place in the volume before us. Still the reader will look in vain for any sensational discoveries which might revolutionize the current views of Charles' reign. While there are corrections and elucidations in detail, the story of blindness and incompetence remains much the same as it appeared before M. Pasquier's volume came to hand.

Pasquier substantiates the traditional belief that the reign of Charles X.